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Abstract
This paper investigates production license management when regulation constrains the 
number of production licenses to address production externalities. This is increasingly rel-
evant for aquaculture production where disease issues threaten future seafood supply. The 
regulatory problem is analyzed in the context of Norwegian salmon aquaculture where a 
stop in issuance of new production licenses has been implemented to address social costs 
of parasitic sea lice. Our theoretical model shows that restricting number of licenses raises 
prices and shifts production efforts excessively towards greater stocking of fish per license. 
Hence, the policy cannot achieve a first-best welfare-maximizing allocation. Furthermore, 
restricting entry by limiting number of licenses can create regulatory rents, which effec-
tively subsides rather than tax the source of the externality.
Keywords Regulations · Food production · Externalities
JEL Classification Q11 · Q22
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the difficulty of efficiently limiting production growth by restrict-
ing number of licenses without also addressing other available production margins. This 
relates our paper to other work in regulation theory showing the problem and complexity 
of regulating single decision variables when multiple margins are available (Smith 2012; 
Squires 2016). Good resource regulations can improve markets by recovering dissipated 
rents (Gordon 1954; Smith 1969), or by reducing incentives for socially wasteful invest-
ments (Homans and Wilen 1997). With decentralized production decisions, getting specific 
regulations right is difficult, getting them wrong is easy.
Aquaculture has been one of the fastest growing food production sectors, but disease 
issues threaten future seafood supply growth (Stentiford et al. 2012). In Norwegian salmon 
aquaculture, the major current issue is the prevalence and spread of parasitic sea lice 
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associated with salmon production (Smith et al. 2010; Asche et al. 2009; Abolofia et al. 
2017). This has led to a stop in the issuance of new production licenses. Little research 
exists on aquaculture farmers responses to such a regulation, which is worrying as it is 
well known that private adaptations to regulations can lead to unintended consequences 
not consistent with the policy objective. It is the purpose of this paper is to investigate 
how farmers manage production licenses when regulators limit the number of licenses to 
address an environmental externality. The regulatory problem will be analyzed in the con-
text of Norwegian salmon farming.
We develop a simple economic model of salmon farming with externalities in produc-
tion. Regulators set the number of production licenses, while private farmers decide on 
the use of their licenses, which for the salmon farming involves decisions on stocking of 
fish per license and harvest timing. We use a calibrated version of the model to show how 
restricting the number of available licenses raises the market price and shifts production 
efforts excessively towards higher stocking density. This will reduce the effectiveness of 
policy in addressing the externality. Specifically, the first-best welfare-maximizing alloca-
tion cannot be achieved by a regulation that only limits the number of licenses. Further-
more, limiting the number of licenses imposes a barrier to entry that can generate regula-
tory rents. This will further strengthen incentives to grow production along unregulated 
margins. The policy will privilege incumbent license owners and subsidize rather than tax 
the source of the externality.
While specifying the exact social costs of the sea lice externality in Norwegian salmon 
farming is beyond the scope of this paper, we argue that the policy response of excessive 
stocking density is unlikely to be compatible with the objective of the policy. While a pol-
icy that reduces number of licenses will ultimately reduce the social cost of the external-
ity through reducing aggregate production, the resulting more intensive use of the licenses 
makes it an inefficient means to reduce the social cost of the externality. The lesson from 
the first-best solution is that reducing number of licenses should be accompanied by regu-
lations that addresses the incentives for excessive stocking, such as a per fish production 
fee. The results in this paper is applicable to licensed production where producers are free 
to decide the use of their licenses. This includes most of aquaculture production.
In Norway, the major environmental concern is the growth and spread of sea lice para-
sites (Abolofia et al. 2017). Sea lice has a direct private cost for farmers (such as increased 
mortality and regulatory imposed treatment costs), but also a social cost by adversely 
affecting the health of wild fish stocks, as well as cross farm location contagion (Krkošek 
et al. 2005, 2007; Torrissen et al. 2013). Number of fish at farm locations raises the abun-
dance of sea lice and the rate of spread of lice between farms (Kragesteen et  al. 2019; 
Jansen et  al. 2012). As such, private stocking decisions are related to both private and 
social costs of sea lice abundance. We provide empirical evidence that stopping the issu-
ance of new licenses did not stop salmon production growth. Rather, production growth 
continued, although at a lower rate, through higher stocking of fish per license. Further-
more, because of the maximum standing biomass restriction on each license, the higher 
stocking induced by the policy has led to a shortening of the grow-out period and smaller 
harvested fish.
Restrictive licensing that limits entry can create regulatory rents that will reward the 
incumbent license owners, risking potentially subsidizing negative externalities. This 
is consistent with what has been the development in the Norwegian salmon aquaculture 
industry since around 2011. Strong demand for salmon with limited opportunities to 
grow production has supported high profitability in the industry. Norway currently has 
a resource tax on petroleum income and has been evaluating the basis for such a tax in 
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salmon farming. Our findings suggest that the rent in salmon farming is not a resource rent, 
but a regulatory rent. The tax should be justified based on efficiently regulating negative 
externalities, not as a transfer of resource rent to the public as for the petroleum tax. For 
the sea lice issue, the proper Pigouvian tax requires an assessment of the social cost of any 
negative effects of production on the health of wild fish stocks, as well as any excess costs 
due to cross farm location contagion.
Our main findings highlight the difficulty of efficiently limiting production growth by 
restricting number of licenses without also addressing other available production margins. 
This relates our paper to other work in regulation theory showing the problem and com-
plexity of regulating single decision variables when multiple margins are available (Smith 
2012; Squires 2016). Good resource regulations can improve markets by recovering dis-
sipated rents (Gordon 1954; Smith 1969), or by reducing incentives for socially wasteful 
investments (Homans and Wilen 1997). With decentralized production decisions, getting 
specific regulations right is difficult, getting them wrong is easy.
Previous research on environmental issues in aquaculture has focused on the sustain-
ability of aquaculture growth and its wider environmental impact (Naylor et al. 2000; Ash-
ley 2007; Naylor et al. 2009; Meijboom and Bovenkerk 2013; Olesen et al. 2011). Com-
paratively little research exists on the problem of regulating aquaculture production to deal 
with externalities. Some insights can be found in the literature on regulations in fisheries. 
For instance, research here has shown that restricting fishing vessel inputs leads vessels 
to substitute unregulated for regulated inputs to maintain catches (Squires 1987, 1994; 
Dupont 1991). Research suggests that regulating a single fishery can generate spillovers 
from regulated to unregulated sectors (Squires and Kirkley 1991; Asche et al. 2007; Chan 
and Pan 2016). Similarly, Cunningham et  al. (2016) show that restrictions on efforts in 
one region can free up capital that is reallocated spatially to another region. Deacon et al. 
(2010) investigate substitution towards an unrestricted input when the fishery is subject to 
restricted entry and season length. Amongst other findings, they show that a higher price 
can reduce rents by raising efforts along the unregulated margin leading to a necessary 
shortening of the season length and a raise in total cost due to lower capacity utilization. 
We investigate the intensive use of aquaculture licenses when number of production license 
is regulated, allowing for explicit private cost as well as social cost escalations due to pri-
vate responses. Policy spillover effects can occur when regulations are compartmentalized 
while private decisions are multifaceted. With stronger property rights, more complete reg-
ulations are possible, however when specific controls rather than objectives are targeted, 
unintended effects are likely to manifest.
2  Background
Norway is the largest producer of Atlantic Salmon, accounting for around 60% of global 
production (Asche and Bjorndal 2011). The major environmental issue facing Norwegian 
salmon farming is sea lice (Lepeophtheirus salmonis), a parasite that attaches to the skin 
of the salmon, affecting appetite and growth (Johnson et al. 2004). Prevalence of sea lice 
causes higher private costs of production (Liu and van Bjelland 2014; Abolofia et al. 2017; 
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Dresdner et al. 2019). In addition, treatment of sea lice leads to increased stress and adult 
mortality.1
Sea lice can transmit to wild salmon and trout populations, with negative effects on the 
health of wild fish stocks (Krkošek et al. 2005, 2007; Torrissen et al. 2013). Sea lice can 
also spread between farm locations. Aldrin et al. (2013) document that 66% of the expected 
salmon lice abundance at a location was attributed to infections within farms, 28% was 
attributed to infection from neighboring farms, and 6% to non-specified sources of infec-
tion. In addition, the number of fish at a farm location raises abundance of sea lice and the 
rate of spread between farms (Kragesteen et al. 2019; Jansen et al. 2012). As such, private 
stocking decisions are related to social costs of sea lice. Kragesteen et al. (2019) argue that 
the spread of lice between farms leads to a tragedy of the common operational environ-
ment, with well-known coordination issues. Furthermore, chemical treatments for sea lice 
can interact negatively with the environment. Contagion in open water sea pens means the 
sea lice becomes a negative externality in salmon farming.
The sea lice problem has led to a stop in issuance of new grow-out production licenses. 
Grow-out licenses are licenses to grow fish in seawater pens for commercial harvest and 
sales. Licenses are issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, and 
are administered by the Directorate of Fisheries.2 Licenses are awarded in perpetuity but 
may be withdrawn under breaches of legal conditions. Each license has an associated maxi-
mum allowable biomass (MAB) of 780 tons. This means that the standing biomass of fish 
associated with a license cannot at any time during the year exceed 780 tons. In 2016, there 
were 990 grow-out production licenses in Norway, and almost all were in commecrial use 
(around 97% according to the Directorate of Fisheries license utilization data).
Figure 1 shows number of grow-out production licenses in Norway, along with global 
salmon production. From 2000 to 2010, global production of Atlantic salmon grew by 5% 
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Fig. 1  Global Atlantic Salmon production and production licenses for Norway
2 Because of natural production requirements, salmon farming is only done in a few regions in the world. 
The primary production regions are Norway, Chile, UK, Faroe Islands, Ireland, North America and New 
Zealand/Tasmania. In all these regions, licensing schemes are in place to regulate production growth.
1 https ://www.dn.no/nyhet er/2017/03/05/1946/Havbr uk/lakse dodel ighet en-til-himme ls.
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production grew by 7.5% p.a., with Norway accounting for only 32% of the growth. For 
Norway, 2009 was the last year of a major issuance of new production licenses.
Production of salmon, Yt , is the product of the number of licences Lt (the extensive mar-
gin) and average production per licence St = Yt∕Lt (the intensive margin). Growth is the 
sum of growth in these margins, Δyt ≡ Δlt + Δst , where lower case letters refer to natural 
logs. When the extensive margin is restricted, any further growth must occur along the 
intensive margin.
This is demonstrated for Norwegian salmon farming in Fig.  2. The left panel shows 
total production and production per license,St , normalized to unity in year 2000. Produc-
tion tripled over the 17-year period, and almost all growth can be accounted for by growth 
along the intensive margin. From 2010, all growth is due to the growth along the intensive 
margin.
We measure stocking density as the number of smolt purchased per license. The right 
panel in Fig. 2 shows the one-year lagged growth rate in stocking density and the growth 
rate in production per license. The one-year lag is necessary to account for the production 
lag from smolt to harvest ready fish; it takes around 18 months to produce harvest ready 
salmon from smolt. The correlation between the two is 0.57. A linear regression shows a 
significant positive elasticity of 0.83 (t-value of 2.6 using HACSE robust standard error 
estimator). That data suggests that increased stocking per license has been the major driver 
of production growth in the industry.
On the market side, high demand for salmon has resulted in record high salmon prices 
(Brækkan and Thyholdt 2014; Asche and Oglend 2016; Brækkan et al. 2018). Norway is 
the world’s largest producer of farmed salmon (around 60% production share), and pro-
duction trends in Norway will have price effects. It is also the case that salmon produc-
tion growth has also been limited in other main production countries (Asche and Bjorndal 
2011).
Figure 3 plots annual average salmon sales prices and private unit production costs (left 
panel), as well as long-run and short-run average accounting profits (defined as price less 
total unit cost for the long run margin, and price less feed cost for the short run margin). 
Both the price of salmon and private profit margins has grown over the sample period. The 





















































































Fig. 2  Normalized production and production per license (left panel) and internal margin growth and 
lagged one-year growth in smolt purchases (right panel)
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et al. (2018) and Misund and Nygård (2018). Margins have grown at a lower rate than price 
because of escalating unit costs. Increasing cost is consistent with diminishing returns from 
the substantial growth along the intensive margin.
3  License Utilization Under Restricted Entry
Fish farmers have two major controls when determining the production per license: stock-
ing density and harvest timing.3 For Norwegian salmon aquaculture, stocking of salmon 
per license more than doubled from 2005 to 2016. In Fig. 4 we show the harvest time and 
harvest weight of salmon.4 Over the sample period the average grow-out period and har-
vest weight of has been declined. There is a trend break in 2011 associated with the end of 
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Fig. 4  Average fish lifespan (left panel) and harvest weight (right panel). Weight developments have been 
adjusted for an increasing linear trend over the period due to improvements in technology and larger smolt 
and so reflects somewhat lower weight levels than normal harvest weight
3 Feeding intensity is also a decision variable but this is almost completely determined by the season which 
affects salmon appetite.
4 Weight developments have been adjusted for an increasing linear trend over the period due to improve-
ments in technology and larger smolt.
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a binding maximum biomass restriction. This will be revisited later in the model results 
section.
We now present the economic model used to investigate how farmers utilize their pri-
vate production licenses when regulators determine the number of available production 
licenses. We postulate theoretical social cost of externality functions and investigate first-
best and second-best policy outcomes. This will allow us to compare equilibrium private 
outcomes to the optimal policy outcomes. In the first-best outcome, the regulator chooses 
number of licenses, stocking per license and harvest time to maximize social welfare. In 
the second-best outcome the regulator can choose only number of licenses, while private 
farmers decide stocking density and harvest time. This latter case reflects the recent Nor-
wegian regulatory regime. The maximum allowed biomass (MAB) per license is assumed 
fixed, but we show some comparative static effects of altering this constraint.
The management of a production license, once acquired, requires the management of 
successive cohorts, or age-classes, of salmon - like other animal production or forestry. 
In salmon farming the start of the production cycle, the initial stocking period, coincides 
with specific times during the year when conditions are especially favorable for stocking 
(primarily spring and fall). Since the stocking time is seasonally determined, the optimal 
harvest problem is equivalent to a single-rotation Faustman forestry problem. This way of 
modelling farm production is consistent with earlier literature on optimal harvest timing 
in aquaculture. This literature highlights that fish in pens are productive capital, equiva-
lent to a standing forest (Bjørndal 1988; Cacho 1997; Guttormsen 2009; Karp et al. 1986). 
Grow-out production from juvenile to harvest ready fish occurs in ocean pens and takes on 
average 18 months. As such, salmon production takes longer than one year, and any single 
producer will at any time have multiple cohorts of fish in the ocean (i.e. juvenile released 
this year, last year, and the year before that) to allow harvesting fish every year. The main 
decision variables for any cohort, which determines production for that cohort, are how 
many juvenile fish to stock for the cohort and at which age to harvest the fish. We introduce 
a growth function that models the weight of the fish as a function of time since stocking, 
which together with the other parameters of the decision problem discussed below allow us 
to determine cohort production. Each cohort decision problem is identical, we are consid-
ering a stationary setting with fixed parameters such that farm production can be modelled 
by choosing stocking density and harvest time for a single cohort.
The total supply in the market is farm production times number of farms. Each farm is 
identical and manages one production license. Our model extends the previous literature 
by introducing the joint stocking density decision to the license management problem. In 
addition, as in Asche et al. (2017) we solve for equilibrium market outcome rather than just 
the single farm outcome.
3.1  The Model
There are m production licenses (farmers). The farmer chooses initial stocking level n0 
(number of fish) and harvest time t . Harvest time is continuous. Each fish grows at a rate 
gt . There is a constant mortality rate of  . To make the solution well-defined, we that 
lim
t→∞
gt < 𝛿 , i.e. at some point fish growth decreases below the mortality rate and stays 
below that level.
An important part of the model is the Maximum Allowed Biomass (MAB) constraint. The 
MAB constraint is such that the standing biomass of fish associated with a license cannot 
exceed MAB limit (currently 780 tons). Denote the total biomass per license at time t by qt . 
 A. Oglend, V.-H. Soini 
1 3
Then the regulation imposes the constraint qt ≤ MAB for all t . This regulation differs from 
individual fishing quotas in fisheries as it does not directly regulate production, but rather the 
stock size of private fish.
Figure 5 displays model-generated equilibrium growth paths of fish biomass for a given 
license both with a high (top panel) and low (bottom panel) MAB . When the MAB is high 
enough, as in the top panel, the farmer harvests everything at the optimal harvest time, 
which we denote by t∗ . If the MAB constraint binds along the growth path we denote the 
first point in time when it binds by tMAB . The get as close as possible to the unconstrained 
optimum, farmer uses early harvesting to keep the biomass exactly on the level of the 
constraint (horizontal line). The rest of the harvest is done at the optimal harvest time t∗ 
(marked by the vertical lines). The marginal revenue product of stocking one more smolt 
will be a key variable throughout the analysis. If the MAB constraint does not bind during 
the optimal growth-path, the marginal product of a fish is computed at the optimal harvest 
time t∗. With a binding MAB constraint, harvest will have to occur at sub-optimal times 
which reduces the marginal product of fish relative to the unconstrained harvest time.











Fig. 5  Model-generated growth-paths of biomass when the MAB constraint does not bind (top panel) and 
when it binds (bottom panel). The horizontal dashed line is the MAB limit determined by the regulator. The 
vertical dashed line is the optimal harvest time determined by Eq. (1). The point in time which corresponds 
to the left end of the flat part in the bottom panel is the earliest harvest time which we denote by t
MAB
 in 
“Appendix 1”. Note that an increase in initial stocking density effectively shifts the growth-paths upwards. 
Harvest time starts at zero at the beginning of the first year after fish was stocked, fish is never harvested 
the year that it is stocked, this makes the harvest time in the above figure lower than the actual harvest time 
counting from the month it was stocked
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The biomass expression accounts for mortality, stocking density and growth of fish. 
Note that for high enough levels of MAB or low levels of n0 , the MAB constraint will never 
bind. If the MAB constraint binds, early harvest in necessary and the farmer will harvest 
fish such that qt = MAB holds exactly. “Appendix 1” derives a closed-form solution for the 
total amount of early harvest and other relevant measures when the MAB constraint binds. 
As our data allows estimation of fish growth rate, the estimation procedure can account for 
the presence of the MAB constraint in a computationally efficient manner.










> 0 . The accumulated feed cost is,
i.e., feed cost is proportional to the total biomass of fish at that time. Here c > 0 is feed cost 
per kilogram fish. Feed is supplied at a constant price by independent fish feed producers.
We assume all costs and revenues are in present value terms relative to the production 
cycle. The farmer’s decision problem is,
where ht is total harvest per license and ct is defined above, p is the aggregate inverse 
demand function, and Q = mht is total quantity produced by all farmers. We assume a com-
petitive market such that an individual producer cannot affect the market price. Coordi-
nated effects of regulations can affect the price through aggregate production.
The first-order condition with respect to harvest time t is
Optimal harvest time is characterized by the growth rate of revenues being equal to the 
cost required to obtain that marginal revenue. Interest costs if modelled would enter the 
decision problem directly as an augmentation to right-hand side the feed cost rate c , i.e. a 
higher economic cost of delaying harvest.
The first-order condition with respect to stocking density n0 is,
where MP = e−twt is the marginal product of an additional fish, where t is either the opti-
mal harvest time t∗ if the MAB constraint does not bind, or tMAB if the MAB constraint 
binds. Optimal stocking of fish requires the marginal revenue product from stocking one 
more fish (left hand side) to equal its marginal cost (comprising average feed cost and mar-
ginal stocking cost).
Equations (1) and (2) characterizes optimal private license management. If number of 
licenses m is decreased, total production Q = mht decreases, and the market price p(Q) in 
(2) increases. Hence optimal stocking n0 increases. From (1), the optimal unconstrained 
grow-out time will increase, given growth is subject do diminishing returns. Whether 
observed harvest time increases or not will depend on the MAB constraint. If it does not 
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and t∗ , and the average harvest time and fish weight will decline relative to the non-binding 
MAB outcome.
Finally, with a fixed number of production licenses in the market, there is limited entry, 
and farmers can earn positive economic profits. However, given the stocking decision (2), 
which does not enter private fisheries decisions, there is no rent on the margin. This is nec-
essarily so because the aquaculture farmer can adjust the number of fish, and so there are 
no stock externalities. Regulators can extract any profits by auctioning licenses, or tax, but 
we do not consider such transfer effects.
3.1.1  First‑Best Solution





where the social cost is increasing in both arguments. The externality is measured in mon-
etary terms.
The first-best outcome maximizes total private profits minus social cost. The optimal 
allocation is the solution to,
The first-order conditions with respect to m,t and n0 are
where subscripts to the externality function indicate partial derivatives with respect to that 
argument. We assume the MAB constraint applies to the first-best case as well. These three 
equations characterize the first-best solution.
3.1.2  Second‑Best Solution
We consider a second-best solution where the social planner can choose only the number 
of licenses m , while farmers choose stocking n0 and harvest time t given m and the MAB 
constraint. This approximates the policy regime in Norwegian salmon farming. We maxi-
mize welfare using the first-order conditions (1) and (2) as constraints. Formally:
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3.1.3  Externality Function Specifications and Numerical Calibration
The exact outcome of regulations will necessarily depend on how the exten-
sive and intensive production margins map to the social cost of the externality. To 













 for some  ∈ (0, 1) . Increasing either m or n0 will lead to 
social costs that are initially small but grows increasingly larger as the margins grow. Based 
on this functional form, we expect a planner to impose a “balanced mix” of m and n0 . The 
weight  measures the relative impacts of the two margins, m and n0 , on social costs. As 
 decreases (higher relative social costs of stocking density), the first-best solution will 
choose lower n0 than the equilibrium outcome with the same number of licenses.
In Sect. 4, we also present results for the case where the environmental externality is on 
total industry production, i.e. it takes the functional form f (Q) = 1
2
Q2.









 , where b > 0 defines the mar-
ginal cost slope. Furthermore, we demand is iso-elastic with inverse demand function, 
p(Q) = Q− where  is the price flexibility parameter, and  is a parameter that will be 
calibrated to make model predictions match price data.
We rely on numerical analysis to investigate model outputs. To do so, we calibrate the 
model to match the average price and production quantity of the Norwegian industry from 
2005 to 2016. The parameters to specify are  in the externality function,  and  in the 
inverse market demand function, the mortality rate  , and cost parameters b , c and f  . The 
following parameter values are chosen:
• We set  = 0.3 and  = 1% , and choose the scaling of the inverse demand function  so 
that the model replicates the average price during the sample period.
• We set  = 0.5 such that externality cost is weighed equally towards stocking density 
and number of licenses. We do not have enough information to tune this parameter and 
so chooses an uninformed prior where both margins are given equal weight.
• Based on the data described earlier in the paper, we know the average production by a 
Norwegian farmer. Furthermore, we have data on the average weight of a fish by month 
of the production cycle, which allows us to construct a measure of the period growth 
rate gt in (1). Hence it is possible to choose c in (1) such that model production is equal 
to actual production.5
• We also know n0 from the data. Hence, we can choose b , the marginal cost slope, such 
that Eq. (2) binds exactly.
The fixed cost of production is not identified by the data and is set to zero for the numer-
ical analysis. With the parametrization we compute equilibrium allocations for various 
levels of m along with the first-best and second-best allocations. The parametrization is 
deemed realistic of qualitative aspects of salmon farming, but as with any such exercises, 
exact numeric outcomes will depend on chosen functional forms and parameter values. 
This will necessarily differ across industries and externalities.
5 There are three remarks to be made here: (1) We include the MAB constraint (MAB = 780 tons which 
was the real restriction in all periods of the sample). (2) We assume that price is a function of total harvest 
by all producers over all months, and hence price is not allowed to fluctuate month by month. (3) We know 
the price of fish feed per kg, but we do not know how much each fish eats. Hence, we control for the price 
of fish feed and choose the amount of fish feed needed per a kilogram of fish to calibrate c.
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4  Results
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the number of licenses m and the optimal stocking 
density n0 , farm revenue, private cost and private cost per kg salmon produced. The solid 
blue equilibrium curves display equilibria of the model for various number of licenses, m . 
The red dot shows the first-best regulatory outcome, the blue dots the second-best outcome.
We note that for the range of licenses (x-axis) in the figures, the MAB constraint 
is always binding. Our calibrated model hence predicts that farmers fully utilize their 
licenses. The appendix replicates the figures for a wider range of number of licenses, 
showing that for sufficiently high number of available licenses the MAB will not bind.
Equilibrium stocking density is decreasing in m (top left panel). When number of 
licenses declines, the optimal response is to intensify the use of existing licenses by 
increasing stocking density. The first-best allocation lies below the equilibrium curve, 
meaning the first-best allocation will choose a lower stocking density n0 . For the second-
best allocation, blue dot, the planner is not able to restrict producers from increasing 
stocking density, n0 . In this case, the regulator will choose a lower number of licenses m 
in order to reduce the externality cost.
Firm revenue and cost are declining in number of licenses. Revenues decline because 
more licenses lead to higher aggregate production and lower price. Furthermore, the lower 
stocking density resulting from more licenses reduces costs. The first-best allocation will 
lead to reduced farm revenue. While the allocation raises price due to constraining aggre-
gate production, it reduces farm level production due to lower stocking such that in total 
farm revenue declines. However, the first-best allocation as also reduces private costs as 
the competitive push along the stocking margin is cut off by the regulation.
Fig. 6  Initial stocking level, firm revenue, firm private cost and private cost per kg as a function of number 
of licenses
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Figures  7 displays equivalent plots for private profits, social costs and price. The 
combined private revenue and cost effects are such that license profits decrease in 
number of licenses. In other words, restricting the number of licenses can put existing 
license owners in a privileged position, raising profits. The second-best solution that 
regulates only number of licenses has a higher private profit than the first-best solution. 
This highlights the private economic cost of fully internalizing the externality.
Social cost 1 uses the baseline specification of the externality function, whereas Social 
cost 2 puts the externality on aggregate production volume. Both cases show increasing 
social cost with increasing number of licenses. The figures also show that the first-best 
allocations are not supported by the private equilibrium. Interestingly, when the social 
cost is on the individual farm margins, the second-best allocation will have lower total 
social cost. This is because the second-best allocation will have to choose lower number 
of licenses to compensate for the private response of increasing the stocking density. In 
total this reduces the social cost when the externality loads on the stocking density mar-
gin. This changes somewhat when the externality is quadratic in total industry production. 
Because the first-best allocation will choose a lower aggregate production, this will reduce 
the social cost when it is a function of aggregate production. These outcomes highlight 
that the outcome of the first- and second-best allocations on social cost will depend on 
exactly how production maps to the social cost. Given the behavioral responses of farmers 
to the regulation controls, this information is important for successful policy design.
As suggested by the revenue plot above, the equilibrium price of salmon will be decreas-
ing in number of licenses, and the first-best price is above the equilibrium curve due to the 
lower enforced total production.
Fig. 7  Private profits, social cost 1 (separate quadratic externality costs for stocking density than number 
of licenses), social cost 2 (quadratic externality cost on aggregate industry production), and the equilibrium 
price as a function of number of licenses. Note that the above price is considerably lower than historically 
average prices due to not accounting for variable costs unrelated to the decision margins investigated in this 
paper (i.e. labor costs, harvest costs, logistic costs)
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Figures  8 displays production outcomes showing equilibrium harvest weight, earli-
est harvest time, production per license and total industry production. The average harvest 
weight is computed by computing the percentage of biomass harvested in each period. As 
the number of licenses increases, equilibrium harvest weight and time increase. This is due 
to the binding maximum biomass restriction, as can be seen in the appendix Fig. 13 which 
includes the production regime when the MAB is not binding. When the MAB is binding, 
more licenses lead to lower stocking density and to the MAB binding later in the production 
cycle, raising harvest weight and time. Because of the lower stocking density in the first-best 
allocation, the production cycle and fish weight will be larger than the equilibrium outcome. 
Even though fish weight increases in number of licenses, the reduction in stocking leads 
to lower production per license. However, an additional license adds more to total industry 
production than the decline in incumbent licenses production removes from production such 
that total production in the industry will increase in number of licenses.
To summarize, a stricter licensing regime reduces supply such that the market price 
increases. The reduced production will also reduce the social cost of the externality. However, 
if the regulation only consists of reducing the reduction number of licenses, private farmers 
will respond to the regulation by raising stocking density. This will moderate the decline in 
social costs induced by the regulation. The degree to which this happens will depend on how 
the stocking margin maps into the social cost. Because of this private response the restricted 
entry regulation alone is sub-optimal. The first-best allocation will moderate the increased 
stocking density, but this allocation is not supported by the private equilibrium.
Until now we have assumed the MAB level is fixed. Figure 9 shows optimal stocking, har-
vested biomass, harvest weight and harvest time as a function of the MAB when the number of 
licenses is fixed at the industry average over the sample period from 2005 to 2016. We see that 
Fig. 8  Harvest weight, average harvest time, harvested quantity per license and total harvest as a function 
of number of licenses. The above harvest time is lower than the actual harvest time reported in Fig. 4 as it 
starts at zero at the beginning of the first year after fish is stocked, while Fig. 4 counts from the month it 
was stocked
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for lower MAB levels, the constraint binds and any further increases in the MAB raises optimal 
stocking, harvested biomass, harvest weight and harvest time. At some level the MAB no longer 
binds, and further increases has no effect on the optimal level of the endogenous variables.
In Fig. 10 we explore impacts of changes in the demand parameter γ, where higher γ 
corresponds to an upward shift in the demand curve. The kinks in the plots is due to the 
MAB constraint. At higher demands, the MAB tends to bind, and so further increases in 
demand raises stocking and production at a lower rate. We observe how harvest weight 
and harvest time increases in demand until the MAB binds, after which it decreases due to 
forced early harvest to comply with the restriction. This contributes to limiting production 
growth in response to higher demand and explains the lower rate of growth in stocking and 
production at demand growth above the kink point. These results are consistent with Fig. 2 
showing a slow-down in Norwegian production from around 2011, and the trend breaks 
in Fig. 5 showing actual average harvest time and harvest weight developments. It clearly 
suggests that the observed behavior of production, harvest time and harvest weight can be 
explained by stronger demand for salmon in a regime restricted entry.
Our findings support a holistic approach to regulations aimed at addressing externalities in 
aquaculture. Private incentives across all available production margins need to be consistent 
with the policy objective; a view of regulation promoted by amongst others Smith (2012) and 
Squires (2016). A textbook Pigouvian tax equal to the social cost of the externality can achieve 
the first-best outcome. For instance, the first-best optimality conditions (Eqs. 3–5) suggest that 
the first-best outcome can be supported by the private equilibrium if regulators choose the 
first-best number of licenses together with a tax equal to the average intensive margin marginal 
social cost, f2(m,n0)
m
 , per fish stocked. However, the correct numeric value of this tax is not clear. 
In addition, any tax imposes administrative costs, but given the second-best regulation also has 
Fig. 9  Initial stocking level, harvest per license, harvest weight and average harvest time as a function of 
MAB
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associated administrative costs this is a lesser concern than the correct tax. Norway already has 
a resource rent tax on petroleum incomes and has been evaluating the basis for such a tax for 
salmon farming. However, it should be noted that the rent in salmon farming is not a resource 
rent. It is a rent supported by the restrictive licensing regulation in a regime of demand growth. 
Such a tax should be justified based on efficiently regulating negative externalities, not as a 
transfer of resource rent to the public. For the sea lice issue, the proper Pigouvian tax requires 
an assessment of the social cost of any negative effects of production on the health of wild fish 
stocks, as well as any excess costs due to cross farm location contagion.
5  Concluding Remarks
Addressing a negative externality by limiting the number of production licenses is a 
potentially attractive policy measure and is commonly used in food production and natu-
ral resource industries. This paper has highlighted some possible consequences of such a 
policy in the context of aquaculture production.
We investigate the policy as a measure to limit social costs of externalities related to sea 
lice in Norwegian salmon farming. Sea lice can spread to wild salmon and trout stocks, as well 
as between farm locations, generating negative externalities. Although the case is specific, the 
results in this paper apply to any production where access is licensed, and producers face pri-
vate decisions on the intensive utilization of their licenses.
We have shown how limiting number of licenses reduces aggregate production and raises 
price. This shifts private production efforts towards more intensive utilization of existing licenses. 
Fig. 10  Initial stocking level, harvest per license, harvest weight and average harvest time as a function of 
demand parameter γ. An increase in γ corresponds to an upward movement of the demand curve
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The model of salmon farming shows that the licensing policy is unable to support the first-best 
policy that maximizes social welfare. This is because the policy is unable to constrain competitive 
efforts to increase stocking density to raise production in response to the higher price. Depending 
on how stocking density maps into social costs, this will moderate the reduction in the externality 
cost from limiting number of production licenses. Restrictive licensing that limits entry can cre-
ate regulatory rents that will reward the incumbent license owners, risking potentially subsidiz-
ing negative externalities. Furthermore, when each production license is subject to a maximum 
standing biomass constraint, the regulation will reduce harvest time and harvested fish weight as 
farmers that raise stocking density will be forced to harvest earlier to avoid violating the maxi-
mum biomass restriction. This is consistent with what has been the development in the Norwe-
gian aquaculture industry since around 2011. Strong demand for salmon with restricted entry has 
reduced the growth rate in production as it can only grow through higher stocking density. This 
has led to binding a binding maximum biomass with smaller harvested fish.
The higher stocking density arising from the regulation has likely not contributed to 
improving sea lice issues. While our stocking density measure is an industry aggregate, it 
likely translates to higher in situ densities given the incentive of greater stocking per produc-
tion license. Excessive in situ stocking density has been shown to increase contagion to wild 
fish, impair fish growth, health and general fish welfare (Ellis et al. 2002; Ashley 2007; Bald-
win 2011; Turnbull et al. 2005; Sveen et al. 2016).
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Appendix 1: Derivation of Harvested Quantities in the Presence 
of a Binding MAB Constraint
This Appendix derives expressions for the harvested quantities in the presence of a bind-
ing MAB constraint. Let us assume that n0 is large enough so that the MAB constraint binds 
before the optimal harvest time given by Eq. (1). We denote the first point in time when the 




wtMAB = MAB along the 
unconstrained growth path.
We will proceed to derive an expression for the total amount of early harvest between tMAB 
and t∗ , where the latter refers to the optimal harvest time given by (1). Since the effective 
fish growth rate gt −  is positive in this time interval, the farmer will have to harvest some 
of the fish by gradually decreasing n0 over time. In this Appendix we use notation n = n(t) 
to account for the number of fish in the pen as a function of time. In the beginning, n = n0 
but after tMAB the farmer will have to decrease n in order to satisfy the constraint. More spe-
cifically, in the interval where MAB binds we have n exp (−t)wt = MAB at all times. Taking 
logs and time-differentiating gives










 . The instantaneous harvest weight in a point in time is given by 
−ṅ exp (−𝛿t)wt and therefore the total early harvest is given by
where the equality follows from the earlier expression for ṅ . By construction, ṅ is such that 
n exp (−t)wt = MABalways holds. The integral above simplifies to
Evaluating this integral gives an expression for the total early harvest:
In addition to the total early harvest, the farmer will harvest MAB , the remainder of 
the fish, at t∗ . The need for fish feed is computed based on the total biomass summed up 
over time. This biomass is given by n0 exp (−t)wt between time 0 and tMAB , and by MAB 
between time tMAB and t∗.
Finally, the harvest time is computed as a weighted average of harvest times where the 
weight is the quantity of harvested fish at that point in time. If hearly denotes the total early har-
vest and ht∗ = MAB denotes the harvest at the optimal harvest time, the harvest time is given by
where the weighted average time for early harvest is given by
In the last expression, −ṅ exp (−𝛿t)wt
hearly
 is the weight, i.e. the ratio of early harvest at a given 
point in time to the total early harvest. Multiplying this by t and integrating over the rele-
vant interval gives the average time for early harvest. As before, the expression for tearly can 
be simplified further along the same lines as before. However, in practice this term is com-
puted by numerical integration.
Appendix 2: Model Outputs for Extended Range of Licenses
The below figures reproduce Figs. 6,7 and 8 in the main document but extends the range 
of number of licenses (x-axis). Licenses greater than the kink-point thresholds reflect out-
comes with a non-binding MAB constraint.
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Fig. 11  Initial stocking level, firm revenue, firm private cost and private cost per kg as a function of num-
ber of licenses. At a sufficiently high number of licenses, the MAB constraint no longer binds, and results 
reflect unconstrained license production
Fig. 12  Private profits, social cost 1 (externality cost on aggregate industry production), social cost (exter-
nality cost on farm stocking density and number of licenses), and equilibrium price as a function of number 
of licenses
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